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Abstract
We study self-organized models for information transmission and herd
behavior in financial markets. Existing models are generalized to take into
account the effect of size-dependent fragmentation and coagulation probabil-
ities of groups of agents and to include a demand process. Non-universal
scaling with a tunable exponent for the group size distribution is found in the
resulting system. We also show that the fragmentation and coagulation prob-
abilities of groups of agents have a strong influence on the average investment
rate of the system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, empirical studies have shown that the price fluctuations measured by the re-
turns in financial markets have a heavy-tailed non-Gaussian distribution [1,2]. Understand-
ing the microscopic mechanism of this market phenomena is a challenging problem that has
recently attracted the interest of physicists [3–5]. In a simple percolation model recently
proposed by Cont and Bouchaud(CB) [6], it is shown that the herd behavior can lead to
the desired fat tails for the distributions of price returns in financial markets. Herd means
a collective phenomena or a crowd effect, and it assumes that agents do not make deci-
sions independently, but they are usually grouped into clusters of agents sharing the same
information and hence making a common decision [7,8]. In the CB model, a random com-
munication network of agents is constructed and the group size distribution of agents is
linked to the distribution of price returns. It is interesting that in such a simple model the
group size distribution of agents has a power law decay with an exponential cut-off, which
can be compared with the fat-tailed distribution of price returns in real markets [6]. To cap-
ture further such a herd behavior, several extensions of the CB model have been presented,
including the fundamentalist influence in the CB model considered by Chang and Stauffer
[9], the self-organized dynamical model of Egu´iluz and Zimmermann(EZ) [10,11] and the
democracy and dictatorship models proposed by D’Hulst and Rodgers [12]. The exponent
characterizing the group size distributions in all of these generalized versions was found to
be robust with the same value of 5/2. Interestingly, however, it was found in a recent work
that this scaling behavior can actually be changed [13]. By introducing the size-dependent
fragmentation and coagulation rates in the generalized EZ model, the group size distribution
of agents was found to be model-dependent with a tunable exponent β(δ) = 5/2− δ, where
δ is the exponent characterizing the power law decay for the probabilities of fragmentation
and coagulation of groups of agents in the system [13].
In this work, we will consider how the demand process in the democracy and dictatorship
models [12] is affected by the dynamical mechanism of the fragmentation and coagulation
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of groups of agents in the system. As in Ref. [13], we also introduce a size-dependent
fragmentation rate fi = s
−δ
i and a size dependent coagulation rate cij = s
−δ
i s
−δ
j to the
existing models. We study how the scaling behavior for the group size distribution of
agents, together with its character distribution Q(p) [12], depends on the parameter δ in the
resulting system. We will discuss both the regimes 0 ≤ δ < 1 [13] and δ ≥ 1.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section II, we define the models and present both
analytical and numerical results for the group size distribution ns. The character distribution
Q(p) of agents is also studied numerically. Section III contains further discussion of the
relationship between the average investment rate a¯ and the parameter δ. A brief summary
of our results and conclusions is also given in this section.
II. THE MODELS
The models proposed in this paper are generalized versions of the democracy and dic-
tatorship models introduced by D’Hulst and Rodgers [12], which aim to describe not only
the information transmission and herd behavior but also the demand process in financial
markets. We consider a system with a total of N agents. Initially, each agent is given a
microscopic parameter p , which is a random number chosen from a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1. Agents are organized into groups sharing the same value of p. Agents
belonging to a group have the same opinion and hence make the same decision at a given
moment in time. At the beginning of the simulation, all the agents are isolated, i.e. each
group has only one agent. At each time step, two agents i and j, with associated number
pi and pj respectively, are selected at random. A microscopic investment rate is defined
as aij = |pi − pj | , i.e., with probability aij agent i and all other agents belonging to his
group decide to make a transaction, i.e. to buy or to sell with equal probability. After
the transaction the group of agent i is broken up into isolated agents with probability s−δi ,
with δ ≥ 0, or the group remains unchanged with probability 1 − s−δi . Once the group of
agent i is fragmented each agent in it will be given a new microscopic parameter p chosen
3
randomly from a uniform distribution between pi − R and pi + R, with 0 < R < 0.5. On
the other hand, with probability 1 − aij agent i decides not to make a transaction and all
the agents in the group of agent i will communicate with the agents in group j, i.e., the two
groups of agent i and agent j will combine to form a bigger group with probability s−δi s
−δ
j ,
or remain separate with probability (1− s−δi s
−δ
j ). Once the two groups of agent i and agent
j are coagulated all agents in both the groups will be given a new common parameter pij.
In the original democracy and dictatorship models, pij = (pi + pj)/2 and pij = pi for the
democracy and dictatorship models, respectively.
In the original democracy and dictatorship models, the group of agent i is fragmented
after a transaction, and conversely the two groups of agent i and agent j are coagulated
if there is no transaction. In the present work, instead, we introduce a size-dependent
fragmentation rate fi = s
−δ
i and a size-dependent coagulation rate cij = s
−δ
i s
−δ
j into the
systems. It seems reasonable for us to introduce such a generalization in a sense that the
size-dependent fragmentation and coagualtion rates can be used to mimic some dynamical
properties in real markets, such as the growth and bankruptcy of businesses [14,15]. That
is to say, smaller businesses are easier to bankrupt, and, on another hand, larger businesses
are more difficult to grow up [16]. So the present models can also be extended to study the
size distribution of businesses.
For our present generalized versions we can also write down a master equation for the
number ns(t) of groups with size s [11–13]
N
∂ns
∂t
= −a¯s1−δns +
(1− a¯)
N
s−1∑
r=1
r1−δnr(s− r)
1−δns−r −
2(1− a¯)s1−δns
N
∞∑
r=1
r1−δnr (1)
for s > 1. Here the constant investment rate a which appeared in the original EZ’s model
[10], as well as in its generalized version [13], has been replaced by an averaged investment
rate a¯ [12]. Each term on the right hand side of Eq.(1) represents the consequence of a
possible action of the agents. The first term describes the dissociation of a group of size s
after a transaction is made. The second term represents coagulation of two groups to form a
group of size s. The third term represents the combination of a group of size s with another
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group. For groups of size unity (s = 1), we have
N
∂n1
∂t
= a¯
∞∑
r=2
r2−δnr −
2(1− a¯)n1
N
∞∑
r=1
r1−δnr. (2)
Here, the first term comes from the dissociation of groups into isolated agents and the second
term describes the combination of a group of size unity with another group. In the steady
state, ∂ns
∂t
= 0, we have
s1−δns =
1− a¯
Na¯ + 2(1− a¯)
∑
∞
r=1 r
1−δnr
x−1∑
r=1
r1−δ(s− r)1−δnrns−r (3)
for s > 1, and
n1 =
Na¯
2(1− a¯)
∑
∞
r=1 r
1−δnr
∞∑
r=2
r2−δns. (4)
Using a generating function method [17], we can derive a self-consistent equation for the
number ns of groups of size s [13]
ns ∼ N


4(1− a¯)[(1− a¯) + Na¯∑∞
r=1
r1−δnr
]
[ Na¯∑∞
r=1
r1−δnr
+ 2(1− a¯)]2


s
s−(
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2
−δ). (5)
For the case of δ = 0, it reduces to the expression for the original democracy and dictatorship
models [12]. It indicates that the power law scaling for the distribution of the group number
ns is non-universal, with a tunable exponent β(δ) =
5
2
−δ for both the generalized democracy
and dictatorship versions. Notice that the power law decay is mediated by an exponential
cut-off term in Eq.[5]. For the democracy model, a¯ ≈ 0, which leads to a unit value for the
exponential cut off. While, for the dictatorship model, a¯ ≈ 0.5, and the exponential cut off
will dominate for larger s [12].
Figure 1 shows our simulation results for the normalized group size distribution ns/n1
depending on s, for various values of the parameter δ. In this paper all simulation results are
obtained in a time window of t = 105 ∼ 106 for a system with N = 104. Averages are taken
over 32 independent runs. For δ = 0, the results for the original democracy and dictatorship
models are recovered, i.e., one obtains a power law scaling with exponent β ≈ 5/2 in both
the models, but with a dominant exponential cut off for larger s in the dictatorship version.
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For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we also have a power law scaling for the group size distribution ns, but with
a tunable exponent β(δ) = 5/2− δ in both models. Thus the exponent β of the power law
scaling for the group size distribution ns is no longer so robust [10–12], but becomes model
dependent and hence non-universal. One finds that the simulation results for the group
size distribution ns in the region of 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 are in good agreement with the analytic
expression given by Eq.[5]. For δ > 1, the scaling behavior of the the group size distribution
ns disappears step by step as δ increases. This indicates that the mean-field analysis of the
master equation is invalid and hence the resulting expression in Eq.[5] for the group size
distribution ns is no longer available once the value of the parameter δ exceeds 1. This
break down of scaling can be understood qualitatively as the coagulation rate is too small
to form large groups of agents for larger δ.
An important feature found in Ref. [12] is that the distributions Q(p) of the p’s for the
democracy and dictatorship models in the steady state are very different. Q(p)dp is defined
as the relative number of the agents associated with a value of the microscopic parameter p
inside (p, p + dp). The results for Q(p) are presented in Figure 2, for various values of the
parameter δ and a given range of R = 0.1. For the democracy model, as shown in Figure 2a,
the system is driven towards a coherent state where the distribution Q(p) is Gaussian-like.
One finds that the amplitude of spread and hence the height of the peak of Q(p) depends
sensitively on δ . For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the peak grows as δ increases. For δ > 1, however, the
peak drops as δ increases. This turns out to be that there is a continuous transition for
the distribution Q(p) occured at around δ = 1. The distribution Q(p) for the dictatorship
model is very different from that obtained in the democracy model. As shown in Figure 2b,
a spontaneous segregation into two equal sized populations occurs, with almost one half of
the agents associated with a value of p near 0 and the rest near 1. The distribution Q(p)
also depends on δ, i.e., Q(p) becomes flat as δ increases. On the other hand, there is no
transition for the distribution Q(p) as δ increases, contrary to what is seen in the democracy
model.
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III. DISCUSSION
We have found so far that the size-dependent fragmentation and coagulation rates can
have a strong influence not only on the scaling behavior of the group distribution ns, but
also on the character distribution, Q(p), of agents. An agent’s microscopic parameter p
is actually a characterization of the way the agent is perceived in the market, rather than
only the individuality of the agent, and hence the distribution Q(p) determines the decision
process in the market [12]. The fact that the distribution Q(p) depends on δ demonstrates
that the mechanism of the fragmentation and coagulation of groups presented in this work
has a strong effect of feedback on the market, which is also reflected in the dependence of
the average investment rate a¯ on the value of δ as shown in Figure 3. For the democracy
model as shown in Figure 3a, the average investment rate a¯ decreases continuously as δ
increases for 0 ≤ δ < 1. For δ > 1, however, a¯ increases with δ. a¯ has a minimum at around
δ = 1. Hence the dependence of the average investment rate a¯ on the value of the parameter
δ shown in Figure 3a is consistent with the dependence of Q(p) on δ in Figure 2a. For the
dictatorship case as shown in Figure 3b, the average investment rate a¯ decreases rapidly
as δ increases from δ = 0 to δ = 2 and becomes flat as δ goes beyond δ ≈ 2. Thus there
is no transition in the average investment rate a¯. The results found in Figure 3b are also
consistent with those in Figure 2b.
We can explain the above observations qualitatively. For the democracy case, it is the
competition between the fragmentation and the coagulation of groups that leads to the
dependence of the character distribution Q(p), and hence the average investment rate a¯,
on the parameter δ. That is to say, the smaller the fragmentation rate is, the easier it is
to form big groups in the steady state. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to form
big groups in the steady state in the case of a small coagulation rate. Hence for a small
value of δ, the fragmentation rate is dominant, which results in a decreasing dependence
of a¯ on δ. When δ exceeds some value, which is about 1 as observed in the simulation,
the coagulation rate becomes dominant and hence leads to an increasing dependence of a¯
7
on δ. For the dictatorship model, the fragmentation rate is no longer dominant in case
of small δ due to the large average effective fragmentation rate f¯effect = a¯f¯ . Hence the
average investment rate a¯ depends only sensitively on the coagulation rate, which leads to
a decreasing dependence of a¯ on δ for all the values of δ ≥ 0.
In summary, we have introduced size-dependent fragmentation and coagulation rates
to the democracy and dictatorship models proposed recently by D’Hulst and Rodgers [12].
As in the generalized version of the EZ model [13], non-universal scaling is found in the
systems. The exponents characterizing the group size distribution in both democracy and
dictatorship models turn out to be model dependent and hence are no longer robust. In
the original EZ model [10], as well as in its generalized version [13], an investment rate a
is given artificially and is fixed during the whole dynamical trade process. In our present
work, however, the microscopic investment rate aij = |pi − pj| is inhomogeneous and is a
dynamical parameter governing the demand process of the system. The most interesting
feature of the present models is that the average investment rate a¯ is strongly influenced by
the dynamical mechanism of the fragmention and coagulation of groups of agents. Hence the
new models seem to be better at mimicing the information transmission and herd behavior,
together with the demand process and the dynamical feedback inherent in real markets.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
DFZ, GJR and PMH acknowledge financial support from The China Scholarship Council,
The Leverhulme Trust and the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong SAR Government
under grant CUHK4241/01P, respectively.
8
REFERENCES
[1] R.N. Mantegna and H.E. Stanley, An Introduction to Econophysics: Correlations and
Complexity in Finance, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000).
[2] P. Gopikrishnan, V. Plerou, L.A.N. Amaral, M. Meyer and H.E. Stanley, Phys. Rev. E
60, 5305 (1999).
[3] P. Bak, M. Paczuski and M. Shubik, Physica A 246, 430 (1997).
[4] J.D. Farmer, Computing in Science and Engineering, Nov/Dec 26 (1999).
[5] T. Lux and M. Marchesi, Nature 397, 498 (1999).
[6] R. Cont and J.-P. Bouchaud, Macroeconomic Dynamics 4, 170 (2000).
[7] R. Topol, Economic Journal 101, 768 (1991).
[8] A. Bannerjee, Rev. of Economic Studies 60, 309 (1993).
[9] I. Chang and D. Stauffer, Physica A 264, 294 (1999).
[10] V.M. Egu´iluz and M.G. Zimmermann, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5659 (2000).
[11] R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Int. J. Theor. Appl. Finance 3, 609 (2000).
[12] R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Physica A 280, 554 (2000).
[13] D.F. Zheng, P.M. Hui and N.F. Johnson, cond-mat/0105474.
[14] K. Nagel, M. Shubik, M. Paczuski and P. Bak, Physica A 287, 546 (2000).
[15] J.J. Ramsden and G. Kiss-Haypal, Physica A 277, 220 (2000).
[16] R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Euro. Phys. J. B21, 447(2001).
[17] See, for example, P.R. Wallace, Mathematical Analysis of Physical Problems, (Dover,
New York 1984), Chapter 7.
9
FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1: Normalized group size distribution ns/n1 as a function of size s on a log-log scale
for (a) the generalized democracy model and (b) the generalized dictatorship model for
different values of δ obtained by numerical simulations (symbols). The values of δ used in
the calculations are: δ = 0, 0.30, 0.60, 1.0, 1.3, 1.6. The solid lines are a guide to the eye
corresponding to exponents β = −2.5,−2.2,−1.9,−1.5 respectively.
Figure 2: Probability distribution Q(p) of the characters p of the agents for (a) the gen-
eralized democracy model and (b) the generalized dictatorship model for different values
of δ obtained by numerical simulations. The values of δ used in the calculations are:
δ = 0, 0.30, 0.60, 1.0, 1.3, 1.6.
Figure 3: Average investment rate as a function of the parameter δ for (a) the generalized
democracy model and (b) the generalized dictatorship model.
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